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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a hardworking employee, Ernst.  Ernst is hired to complete 
low skill, hard labor at a slaughterhouse for twelve dollars per hour.  He 
speaks little English, is not well known to his employer, and is far from 
indispensable.  Each day, Ernst arrives thirty minutes before his assigned 
shift to set up his work station, works through lunch, and, because the 
slaughterhouse expects him to complete significant post-shift duties, 
leaves work thirty minutes after clocking out.  The slaughterhouse 
automatically deducts a full lunch hour from Ernst’s recorded hours every 
day without regard to whether he ate lunch.  Because Ernst receives no 
compensation for the time he spends working through lunch, nor for his 
pre-shift and post-shift work, the slaughterhouse fails to compensate Ernst 
for ten work hours per week.1  Thus, though Ernst typically works a forty-
five hour week, he only receives compensation for thirty-five hours. 
How can Ernst redress this mistake?  As a practical matter, he cannot 
sue his employer in contract, because he cannot afford to anger his 
employer and risk his livelihood.  The United States Department of Labor 
exists to protect employees from such exploitation, and ordinarily might 
independently step in to investigate without requiring Ernst to initiate legal 
action. 
                                                          
*  Thank you to Kim Flores, Alice Jacks, and all the attorneys at the Kansas City United States 
Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, for allowing me to work with you and learn from you.  
Thank you Kurt and Mindy Schoeb and Shelby Politte for your unwavering love and support.  
 1.   This hypothetical is adapted from Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016).  
This Comment assumes pre-shift and post-shift donning and doffing time is compensable as “integral 
and indispensable” to the employer’s principal activities under the Portal-to-Portal Act.  Id. at 1039; 
see 29 U.S.C. § 254 (2012) (Portal-to-Portal Act language addressing “[r]elief from liability and 
punishment under the Fair Labor Standards Act . . . for failure to pay minimum wage or overtime 
compensation”); Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513, 519 (2014) (“We hold that an 
activity is integral and indispensable to the principal activities that an employee is employed to 
perform—and thus compensable under the FLSA—if it is an intrinsic element of those activities and 
one with which the employee cannot dispense if he is to perform his principal activities.”).  
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However, as this Comment will explain, under the federal Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 19382 (“FLSA” or “Act”) the federal overtime and 
minimum wage provisions only explicitly require reimbursement for (1) 
the unpaid hours above the forty-hour per week overtime threshold, and 
(2) to the extent any unpaid hours cause Ernst’s average hourly rate of pay 
to fall below the statutory minimum wage.3  Thus, as to the five hours 
between Ernst’s thirty-fifth and fortieth hour, the FLSA does not facially 
compel payment4 despite the significant financial loss Ernst stands to 
suffer over time. 
These five unpaid hours exemplify what courts have dubbed 
“overtime gap time.”5  Overtime gap time, the subject of this Comment, 
involves unpaid non-overtime hours employees work during overtime 
weeks.  Because these hours slip through the statutory gap between the 
Act’s overtime and minimum wage provisions, judges have been largely 
left to “bridge the gap” as their reasoning compels. 
Two distinct common law approaches have emerged.  One approach, 
the “Lundy approach,”6 derives from the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Lundy v. Catholic Health Systems of Long Island Inc., and does not compel 
overtime gap time reimbursement.  The competing approach, the 
“Monahan approach,”7 derives from the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
Monahan v. County of Chesterfield and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Donovan v. Crisostomo,8 and holds that employees have not been paid 
proper overtime compensation unless all overtime gap time is also paid. 
This Comment argues that the FLSA, its purpose, and proper 
deference to departmental authority compel courts to recognize a remedy 
for overtime gap time.  Part II outlines the relationship between overtime 
gap time and the Act, explains the Act’s context and purpose, and sets 
forth the current split in authority among the Courts of Appeals.  Part III 
                                                          
 2.   29 U.S.C. § 201–219 (2012). 
 3.   Instead, those provisions only explicitly compel reimbursement (1) for any unpaid hours 
that exceed the forty-hour-per-week overtime threshold, and (2) to the extent an employee’s average 
hourly wage falls below the statutory minimum wage.  29 U.S.C. § 206 (imposing a minimum wage 
on all hours worked), 207 (implementing a premium overtime rate of pay as to all hours worked above 
forty in a single week). 
 4.   Ernst earned twelve dollars per hour, and was paid for thirty-five hours of work.  His 
employer paid him $420 total ($12 per hour x 35 hours paid).  Thus, by dividing the hours he actually 
worked by his total weekly payment, as is necessary to determine whether he is owed any 
reimbursement under the federal minimum wage provision, Ernst theoretically earned $9.33 per hour, 
a rate that exceeds the minimum wage of $7.25 per hour ($420 / 45 hours).   
 5.   Monahan v. County of Chesterfield, 95 F.3d 1263, 1266 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 6.   Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 7.   Monahan, 95 F.3d 1263. 
 8.   Donovan v. Crisostomo, 689 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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advocates for a pro-overtime gap time, “Monahan approach,” and rejects 
the contrary “Lundy approach.” 
II. BACKGROUND 
Enacted pursuant to Congress’ Commerce Clause authority9 to 
diminish the rampant unemployment and poverty that left America reeling 
in the wake of the Great Depression,10 the FLSA sets forth and implements 
federal employment standards to combat employers’ avarice and ensure 
individual American workers receive fair pay for humane work.11  Today, 
these employment standards govern private, federal, and state employers 
whose employees engage in interstate commerce.12  Overtime gap time 
arises under this framework. 
Naturally then, this inquiry begins with the Act.  This section first 
outlines the relevant statutory text, regulations, and advisory 
interpretations and explains how these provisions fail to dictate the 
appropriate treatment of overtime gap time.  It then provides context to 
help resolve the ambiguity by discussing the history surrounding the 
FLSA’s enactment and the purpose the Congress intended the Act to serve.  
Finally, it outlines the diverging ways the Courts of Appeals have 
reconciled the ambiguity and sets forth two distinct approaches to 
overtime gap time. 
A. Overtime Gap Time in Context 
Under the FLSA, federal employment law is simultaneously a 
statutory and regulatory creature.  The FLSA contains broad statutory 
mandates13 and a series of regulations explaining how companies must 
implement those mandates.14  The Wage Hour Division of the Department 
of Labor (“WHD”) implements these provisions and investigates unlawful 
employment practices under the supervision of an appointed 
Administrator.15  The Act further empowers the Administrator to 
                                                          
 9.   See generally United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 10.   Lawrence E. Henke, Comment, Is the Fair Labor Standards Act Really Fair?  Government 
Abuse or Financial Necessity: An Analysis of the Fair Labor Standards Act 1974 Amendment—The § 
207(k) Exemption, 52 SMU L. REV. 1847, 1851 (1999). 
 11.   See 29 C.F.R. § 776.0a (2017).  
 12.   U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., WAGE & HOUR DIVISION, HANDY REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE FAIR 
LABOR STANDARDS ACT 2–3 (2016), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/wh1282.pdf. 
 13.   See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012). 
 14.   See 29 C.F.R. §§ 500–870 (2017). 
 15.   29 U.S.C. §§ 204, 211. 
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promulgate regulations that explain, expand, and carry out the broad 
statutory provisions.16  The Administrator routinely issues advisory 
interpretations, discussed below, to comprehensively explain how this 
framework operates.17 
Overtime gap time mainly implicates two sections of the FLSA: the 
minimum wage provision18 and the overtime, or “maximum hours” 
provision.19  Workweeks20 in which employees work forty hours or less 
constitute “nonovertime workweeks.”21  This Comment will refer to 
workweeks in which employees work more than forty hours as “overtime 
workweeks.”  All hours employees work below forty constitute “straight 
time” hours,22 while all hours that employees work beyond forty constitute 
“overtime hours.”23 
The minimum wage provision, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206, requires 
that employers pay employees at least a specified minimum wage “rate.”24  
The current minimum wage rate is “$7.25 an hour.”25  The minimum wage 
provision does not specify how employers should calculate the wage rate 
and does not further define the word.26  Despite this statutory omission,27 
parties customarily determine whether an employer has paid at least the 
minimum wage by comparing the actual remuneration the employee 
received in a given pay period to the amount the employee would receive 
if he were paid the minimum wage, computed by multiplying the 
minimum wage by the number of hours the employee worked.28 
                                                          
 16.   Id. §§ 204, 206–07; see 29 C.F.R. §§ 500–870. 
 17.   29 C.F.R. §§ 775–794. 
 18.   29 U.S.C. § 206. 
 19.   Id. § 207. 
 20.   A workweek is defined as “seven consecutive 24-hour periods.”  29 C.F.R. § 778.105. 
 21.   Id. § 778.101. 
 22.   Though the FLSA does not define “straight time,” the regulations issued by the 
Administrator freely refer to the hours worked below 40 as straight time hours.  See, e.g., id. §§ 
778.311, 778.315, 778.500.   
 23.   Id. § 778.101. 
 24.   29 U.S.C. § 206. 
 25.   Id.  
 26.   See id. 
 27.   The minimum wage provision’s failure to describe the appropriate method for determining 
whether an employer has failed to pay minimum wage is explained in detail in Part III below. 
 28.   See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 531.36 (explaining that where an employer deducts amounts for 
lodging from an employee who receives an hourly rate above the statutory minimum, the deductions 
will not violate the minimum wage provision and need not follow the rules for making deductions 
because the employee has received at least the minimum wage for each hour worked); see also Hensley 
v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 786 F.2d 353, 357 (8th Cir. 1986); Dove v. Coupe, 759 F.2d 
167, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Blankenship v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 415 F.2d 1193, 1197–98 (4th 
Cir. 1969); United States v. Klinghoffer Bros. Realty Corp., 285 F.2d 487, 490 (2d Cir. 1960); 29 
C.F.R. § 783.43 (noting that, in the context of computing a seaman’s minimum wage, the wage is paid 
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Critically, because employers need not compensate employees on an 
hourly basis and instead may structure payments in salary form, the 
minimum wage provision does not require that employers pay employees 
for each individual hour an employee works in a week.29  Under 
longstanding practice, so long as the employee’s average rate of pay 
mathematically equals or exceeds the $7.25-per-hour federal minimum 
wage for all hours worked, the employer has not violated § 206—even if 
the employer omits hours when it calculates compensation so that 
employees have in fact received zero dollars per hour for some hours of 
work.30 
The overtime, or “maximum hours,” provision, codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 207, forbids any employer from permitting his employees to work more 
than forty hours in a single workweek, “unless such employee receives 
compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified 
at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he 
is employed.”31  The overtime provision purports to define the term 
“regular rate,” but it does not provide an equation for computing the 
regular rate.32  Specifically, in the event that an employer fails to fully 
compensate its employees for the time they worked, the Act does not 
indicate whether the regular rate should be computed with reference to 
each individual hour worked or based on the mathematical average.33 
Instead, the Act merely states that the regular rate “shall be deemed to 
include all remuneration for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the 
employee,” and then excludes specific payments that do not resemble 
typical compensation.34  In defining regular rate only by reference to 
inclusions and exclusions, and without any mathematical formula or 
further definition, the Act assumes the term is self-explanatory.  The 
regulations and case law provide clarity: they further define the regular 
rate as the hourly rate at which an employee is employed35 during a 
“normal, non-overtime workweek.”36 
                                                          
if in the pay period the seaman has received an amount at least equal to the minimum wage times the 
amount the seaman actually worked). 
 29.   See 29 U.S.C. § 206.  
 30.   U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., WAGE & HOUR DIVISION, FACT SHEET #70: FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS REGARDING FURLOUGHS AND OTHER REDUCTIONS IN PAY AND HOURS WORKED ISSUES 
1 (2009), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs70.pdf. 
 31.   29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).  
 32.   Id. § 207(e).  
 33.   Id. 
 34.   Id. 
 35.   Id. § 207; 29 C.F.R. § 778.109 (2017). 
 36.   149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331 U.S. 199, 204, modified, 331 U.S. 795 (1947). 
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Parties and courts often compute the regular rate “by dividing [an 
employee’s] total remuneration for employment (except statutory 
exclusions [and overtime compensation already paid]37) in any workweek 
by the total number of hours actually worked by him in that workweek.”38  
Ordinarily, as to hourly employees, the mathematical regular rate will 
equal the agreed hourly wage.39  Section 207 does not otherwise explicitly 
discuss payments attributable to the first forty hours an employee works 
in a week.40 
If an employer fails to properly compensate his employees pursuant to 
these provisions, he must pay back wages equal to the amount owed41 plus 
an equal amount for “liquidated damages.”42  An employer may escape 
liability for liquidated damages if he can prove as an affirmative defense 
that he acted in good faith.43 
Though the overtime and minimum wage provisions clearly indicate 
appropriate pay practices for uncompensated overtime hours and 
minimum wage violations respectively, no provision clearly governs what 
courts have dubbed “gap time.”44  “Gap time” refers to uncompensated 
work time “not covered by the overtime provisions because it does not 
exceed the overtime limit, and . . . not covered by the minimum wage 
provisions because, even though it is uncompensated, the employees are 
still being paid a minimum wage when their salaries are averaged across 
their actual time worked.”45  In nonovertime weeks, this uncompensated 
straight time is called “pure gap time.”46  In overtime weeks, it is called 
“overtime gap time.”47  This Comment analyzes the extent to which the 
text of sections 206 and 207 support a claim for gap time in Part III below. 
The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division has published 
several relevant advisory interpretations—codified in the C.F.R. part that 
                                                          
 37.   29 U.S.C. § 207(h)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 778.206. 
 38.   29 C.F.R. § 778.109. 
 39.   Id. §§ 778.110, 778.108. 
 40.   See 29 U.S.C. § 207. 
 41.   Id. § 216(b). 
 42.   Id. §§ 216(b), 260. 
 43.   Id. § 260. 
 44.   See Monahan v. County of Chesterfield, 95 F.3d 1263, 1266 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 45.   Rosario v. First Student Mgmt. LLC, No. 15-6478, 2016 WL 4367019, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 
16, 2016) (quoting Adair v. City of Kirkland, 185 F.3d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 46.   See Monahan, 95 F.3d at 1266.  In the opening hypothetical, Ernst would have encountered 
pure gap time if he did not engage in unpaid pre- and post-shift work, such that he actually worked 
forty (rather than forty-five) hours but was only paid for thirty-five hours.  Only one federal circuit 
has recognized a viable claim for pure gap time.  Lamon v. City of Shawnee, 972 F.2d 1145, 1155–58 
(10th Cir. 1992). 
 47.   See Monahan, 95 F.3d at 1266 (describing the plaintiffs’ overtime gap time claim). 
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contains the regulations48—that compel employers to pay overtime gap 
time, but not pure gap time.49  However, unlike regulations, these 
interpretations do not carry the force of law, but instead merely indicate 
the construction “the Administrator believes to be correct and which will 
guide him in the performance of his administrative duties under the Act.”50  
The Act itself does not authorize or even contemplate advisory 
interpretations,51 though it does create the office of the Administrator, and 
empower the Administrator to enforce the Act through regulations and 
orders.52 
Despite their weak statutory authority, the advisory interpretations 
provide courts with significant guidance, and the Supreme Court has 
instructed that an interpretation merits deference to the extent a judge finds 
it persuasive based on “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.”53  
Thus, in ambiguity, judges routinely defer to the Administrator’s expertise 
and accord the interpretations significant weight. 
One particularly relevant interpretation, entitled “Payment for all 
hours worked in overtime workweek is required,” provides: 
Overtime compensation, at a rate not less than one and one-half times 
the regular rate of pay, must be paid for each hour worked in the 
workweek in excess of the applicable maximum hours standard.  This 
extra compensation for the excess hours of overtime work under the Act 
cannot be said to have been paid to an employee unless all the straight 
time compensation due him for the nonovertime hours . . . has been 
paid.54 
A related interpretation forbids employers and employees from 
contracting around this mandate: 
An agreement not to compensate employees for certain nonovertime 
hours stands on no better footing since it would have the same effect of 
diminishing the employee’s total overtime compensation.  An 
agreement, for example, to pay an employee whose maximum hours 
standard for the particular workweek is 40 hours, $5 an hour for the first 
35 hours, nothing for the hours between 35 and 40 and $7.50 an hour for 
                                                          
 48.   See 29 C.F.R. §§ 500–697, 775–794 (2017).  
 49.   29 C.F.R. §§ 778.103, 778.315, 778.317, 778.322. 
 50.   Id. § 776.0a. 
 51.   See 29 U.S.C. § 201–219 (2012). 
 52.   See id. §§ 204, 206(a)(2), 207(e). 
 53.   Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 54.   29 C.F.R. § 778.315 (emphasis added); see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 778.317, 778.322.  
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the hours in excess of 40 would not meet the overtime requirements of 
the Act.  Under the principles set forth in § 778.315, the employee would 
have to be paid $25 for the 5 hours worked between 35 and 40 before 
any sums ostensibly paid for overtime could be credited toward overtime 
compensation due under the Act.  Unless the employee is first paid $5 
for each nonovertime hour worked, the $7.50 per hour payment 
purportedly for overtime hours is not in fact an overtime payment.55 
Thus, though the text of Act does not explicitly compel payment of 
gap time, certain advisory interpretations have interpreted the Act to 
require such payment during overtime weeks, but not during nonovertime 
weeks.  The extent to which these interpretations find textual support is 
discussed in more detail in Part III below. 
Some examples, illustrated in Exhibit 1, clarify the distinction 
between pure and overtime gap time.  Recall Ernst, the slaughterhouse 
employee who earns $12 per hour.  Further recall that when Ernst works 
in the slaughterhouse, he spends thirty unpaid pre-shift minutes preparing 
his work station and donning protective gear and an equal amount of 
unpaid time removing, or “doffing,” his gear and cleaning his workstation 
after work, and that he routinely works through lunch without 
compensation.56  Assume that on some days Ernst does not work the 
slaughterhouse floor, but instead cleans the slaughterhouse, and that on 
those “cleaning days” he typically eats lunch and does not prepare a work 
station nor don protective gear.  He therefore receives full and accurate 














                                                          
 55.   Id. § 778.317. 
 56.   See, e.g., Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1041 (2016) (finding “donning and 
doffing” overtime hours compensable under the FLSA).  
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In Week 1, the slaughterhouse schedules Ernst to process meat for six 
hours on Monday, and to clean for eight hours on Tuesday through Friday.  
Though he is technically only scheduled to work thirty-eight hours during 
Week 1, because he spends one unpaid hour donning and doffing his 
protective gear and one unpaid hour working through lunch, he actually 
works forty compensable hours.  Week 1 is a nonovertime workweek 
because Ernst worked exactly forty hours.  The slaughterhouse owes him 
$480 for his work ($12 x 40 hours), but “shorts” him two straight time 
hours and pays him $456 ($12 x 38) rather than the $480 he is due.  Though 
the slaughterhouse has violated the terms of the parties’ express or implied 
contract, it has not violated the minimum wage provision because Ernst 
earned $11.40 per hour on average ($456 / 40 hours = $11.40), an amount 
that exceeds the $7.25 statutory minimum rate of pay.  The two straight 
time hours the slaughterhouse shorts Ernst in Week 1 constitute “pure gap 
time.”  They are not compensable under the minimum wage provision. 
Assume in Week 2 Ernst cleans every day and works forty hours.  
Though the slaughterhouse again owes Ernst $480, it purposely shorts his 
paycheck by 20 hours and pays him $240 for forty hours of work.  
Mathematically, Ernst earned only $6.00 per hour ($240 / 40 hours = $6.00 
per hour), a rate well below the $7.25-per-hour statutory minimum wage.  
As a result, the slaughterhouse violated the minimum wage provision of 
the FLSA.  It must reimburse Ernst the amount necessary to elevate his 
average rate of pay to $7.25 per hour (40 hours x $7.25 per hour = $290; 
$290 owed – $240 paid = $50 due).  Though Ernst technically earned zero 
dollars per hour for twenty hours of work, his employer need not pay him 
the full amount it would owe him for forty hours of work at his regular 
rate of pay because the minimum wage provision does not require payment 
for all hours worked. 
In Week 3, the slaughterhouse schedules Ernst to process meat for 
eight hours on Monday and to clean for eight hours Tuesday through 
Friday.57  Because the slaughterhouse owes Ernst compensation for the 
donning and doffing time and the foregone lunch hour, Ernst works forty-
two, rather than forty, compensable hours in Week 3.  The two additional 
hours make Week 3 an overtime workweek, and the overtime provision 
now governs.  Under the overtime provision, the slaughterhouse owes 
Ernst $516 for the work he performed during Week 3, calculated pursuant 
to his regular rate of pay: $480 for hours one through forty (40 hours x $12 
per hour = $480), and $36 for hours forty-one and forty-two (1.5 x $12 
“regular rate” = $18 per hour; $18 x 2 hours = $36).  If the slaughterhouse 
                                                          
 57.   Week 3 directly mirrors the facts in Tyson Foods. 
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again fails to compensate Ernst for two hours of work and pays him only 
$480, it violates the overtime provision and owes Ernst $36 in back wages. 
Confusion arises, however, when the slaughterhouse shorts Ernst both 
straight and overtime hours during an overtime week.  In Week 4, the 
slaughterhouse schedules Ernst to process meat for six hours on Monday 
and Tuesday, and clean for eight hours Wednesday through Friday.  Ernst 
is scheduled to work thirty-eight hours in Week 4, but he actually works 
forty-two compensable hours.  Because he worked more than forty hours 
in Week 4, the overtime provision applies.  Ernst’s regular rate of pay 
again entitles him to receive $516 ($12 per hour x 40 hours = $480; 1.5 x 
$12 per hour = $18 per hour overtime rate; $18 x 2 hours = $36; $480 + 
$36 = $516).  This time, however, the slaughterhouse fails to compensate 
Ernst for two straight time hours and two overtime hours, and instead pays 
Ernst $456.  Though the slaughterhouse paid Ernst zero dollars per hour 
for the shorted hours, it has not indisputably violated the minimum wage 
provision because Ernst’s total compensation divided by the number of 
hours he actually worked equals an average rate of pay that exceeds the 
federal minimum wage ($456 / 42 hours = $10.86 dollars per hour).  
However, because this is an overtime week, Ernst is entitled to receive 
compensation at a rate of one and one-half times his regular rate for all 
hours above forty hours.  The slaughterhouse therefore certainly owes 
Ernst overtime compensation. 
Week 4 illustrates the problems that overtime gap time presents.  
Should the two uncompensated straight time hours “slip through the gap” 
between the minimum wage and the overtime provisions, so that the 
slaughterhouse’s improper pay practices effectively diminish the full 
amount it owes?  If so, what is the correct overtime rate: one and one-half 
times Ernst’s contractual regular rate of pay, or one and one-half times his 
mathematical regular rate—the total compensation he received divided by 
the total hours worked?  Has Ernst truly received full and accurate 
overtime compensation if he receives no pay for the straight time hours?  
Because the statutory text does not resolve this ambiguity, this Comment 
next turns to the Act’s history and purpose for guidance.58 
B. Historical Significance and Purpose 
Born amid desperation, the FLSA was enacted to remedy the dire 
economic hardship that shook the country in the wake of the Great 
                                                          
 58.   See, e.g., Monahan v. County of Chesterfield, 95 F.3d 1263, 1267 (4th Cir. 1996) (discussing 
the history and purpose of the Fair Labor Standards Act). 
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Depression.59  Because this impetus underlies the Act’s intent and effect, 
the Act’s history and purpose necessarily informs its interpretation.60 
In 1929, America veered wildly away from a period of relative 
economic stability and crashed headlong into a Great Depression.61  Over 
the next ten years, Americans watched as booming stock prices toppled to 
unmatched lows and the United States’ once promising production rates 
fell from their pedestal, endured four “banking panics,” starved through 
crippling drought and a resulting “dust bowl,” and severely curtailed their 
spending.62  Competition for work surged while hiring rates stagnated and 
fell.63  Failing businesses laid off workers in droves,64 and millions of 
Midwesterners abandoned their homes and farms.65  By 1933, twenty-five 
percent of the American workforce and thirty-seven percent of all nonfarm 
workers were unemployed.66  This precarious political climate led to the 
election of Franklin D. Roosevelt.67 
Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected president in 1932, ousting 
incumbent President Herbert Hoover in a landslide victory.68  The new 
president immediately implemented a series of executive orders and 
comprehensive legislation to address the economic crisis in his famous 
“New Deal.”69  The FLSA constituted a key component of Roosevelt’s 
plan to heal the nation.70 
                                                          
 59.   Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a Minimum 
Wage, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR OFF. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ADMIN. & MGMT., 
https://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/flsa1938.htm#21 (last visited Jan. 28, 2018). 
 60.   See Ruth Milkman, Women Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act, Past and Present, 
in A PAPER SERIES COMMEMORATING THE 75TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 
281, 284 (2010), https://www.dol.gov/asp/evaluation/reports/FLSAPaperSeries.pdf. 
 61.   See ERIC ROUCHWAY, THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE NEW DEAL: A VERY SHORT 
INTRODUCTION 14–19 (2008). 
 62.   See Great Depression, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/ 
event/Great-Depression (last visited Jan. 28, 2018). 
 63.   See id. 
 64.   See ROUCHWAY, supra note 61, at 33. 
 65.   See id. at 72–87. 
 66.   Gene Smiley, The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics: Great Depression, LIBR. OF ECON. 
& LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/GreatDepression.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2018). 
 67.   See Michael E. Parrish, The Great Depression, the New Deal, and the American Legal 
Order, 59 WASH. L. REV. 723, 723 (1984). 
 68.   ROUCHWAY, supra note 61, at 35.  
 69.   See id. at 56–68. 
 70.   See John S. Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 464, 472 (1939); see generally Howard D. Samuel, Troubled Passage: The Labor Movement 
and the Fair Labor Standards Act, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 2000, at 32, 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2000/12/art3full.pdf. 
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The FLSA was designed to accomplish a primary goal and two 
competing secondary goals.71  Each proffered purpose plainly responds to 
the economic destitution the Act was intended to ameliorate, and each is 
plainly carried out through the Act’s overtime and minimum wage 
provisions.72  As its overarching purpose, Congress intended the Act to 
help permanently heal the nation’s wounded economy.73  The Act 
accomplishes this economic aim through two competing goals: improve 
American workers’ wages, working conditions, and general well-being,74 
but balance the benefit it provides to workers against the penalties it 
imposes on business owners.75 
The minimum wage provision clearly serves the Act’s primary 
economic goal.76  It aims to establish a minimum livable wage sufficient 
to increase workers’ spending power and reduce need for government 
aid.77  Congressional leaders reasoned that the minimum wage would 
jumpstart economic recovery because workers with more money would 
demand more products, and industry would respond to this demand by 
expanding and hiring more employees.78 
The overtime provision’s overarching economic benefit derives from 
the inherent loss it imposes on employers.79  A “cornerstone of the Act,”80 
the costly overtime premium rate of pay spreads wealth among the 
population and combats unemployment.81  It does so by providing 
employers with a choice: ask existing employees to suffer arduous 
workweeks but pay an accompanying overtime penalty, or “spread the 
                                                          
 71.   See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2012); Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat (Recovery Program) (July 
24, 1933) [hereinafter Roosevelt Fireside Chat] (transcript available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14488); see also generally H.R. REP. NO. 1452 (1937). 
 72.   See 29 U.S.C. §§ 202, 206–07 (setting forth the statutory purpose and implementing the 
overtime and minimum wage provisions). 
 73.   See generally Roosevelt Fireside Chat, supra note 71; H.R. REP. NO. 1452. 
 74.   See 29 U.S.C. § 202. 
 75.   See id. 
 76.   See Roosevelt Fireside Chat, supra note 71 (discussing the intended effect of minimum wage 
and maximum hours provisions). 
 77.   81 CONG. REC. 7713, 7746 (1937) (statement of Sen. Borah).  
 78.   See id. at 7745–47. 
 79.   See Note, Overtime Compensation Under the Fair Labor Standards Act for Workers with a 
Fluctuating Number of Hours Per Week, 52 YALE L.J. 159, 160–61 (1942); A “Fireside Chat” 
Discussing Legislation to Be Recommended to the Extraordinary Session of the Congress, in PUBLIC 
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: 1937 VOLUME: THE CONSTITUTION PREVAILS 
429, 435 (1937). 
 80.   Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, 
Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 38,516, 38,518 (July 6, 2015) (codified at 29 
C.F.R. pt. 541) (effective date December 1, 2016). 
 81.   MARC LINDER, MOMENTS ARE THE ELEMENTS OF PROFIT: OVERTIME AND THE 
DEREGULATION OF WORKING HOURS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 35–51 (2000). 
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wealth”—hire more workers, reduce each employee’s weekly workload, 
and avoid the overtime penalty.82  Thus, the overtime wage largely exists 
to penalize employers who fail to spread wealth among American 
citizens.83 
The Act’s second, more targeted goal of diminishing “labor conditions 
detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living 
necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers,”84 
speaks directly to the individual workers who comprise the economy’s 
backbone.85  The minimum wage provision facially aids individual 
workers by ensuring those workers receive a “fair day’s pay for a fair day’s 
work.”86  It further purports to prevent an effective “race to the bottom,” 
in which businesses subject workers to increasingly inadequate rates of 
pay to compete in the marketplace.87  Notably, Congress did not design the 
minimum wage provision to ensure workers live opulent lifestyles, but 
instead aimed to provide a wage “floor” just sufficient to lift the lowest 
paid full-time workers out of poverty.88 
The overtime provision also plainly effectuates the Act’s second 
goal.89  Congress designed the overtime penalty to deliver Americans from 
an unduly “oppressive” workweek,90 by simultaneously discouraging 
overtime and fairly compensating employees for the physical and 
emotional hardship they suffer during the “intolerable hours” inherent in 
overtime workweeks.91  Roosevelt reasoned that this effective cap on 
                                                          
 82.   Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, 
Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. at 38,517. 
 83.   Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bayley, 319 U.S. 44, 48 (1943); Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. 
Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 576, 578 (1942), superseded by statute, Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. 
No. 80-49, 61 Stat. 84, as recognized in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985); 
LINDER, supra note 81, at 42–43, 47–48. 
 84.   29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012).  
 85.   See generally United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 86.   Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981).  
 87.   See, e.g., 82 CONG. REC. 1601–02 (1937) (statement of Rep. Martin) (discussing the 
hardship placed on businesses in states with more progressive employment laws as they struggle to 
compete with businesses permitted to pay a substandard wage).  
 88.   See 81 CONG. REC. 7745 (1937) (statement of Sen. Black) (arguing that the bill would help 
those who currently “earn less than a decent living,” while remaining limited in scope).  See also 82 
CONG. REC. 1601 (1937) (statement of Rep. Martin) (acknowledging that the bill is intended to “help 
the wage earners receive a better break” and “elevate industrial conditions and give protection” from 
employers who would otherwise pay merely “starvation wages”). 
 89.   See LINDER, supra note 81, at 41. 
 90.   82 CONG. REC. 1488 (1937) (statement of Rep. Mott). 
 91.   See LINDER, supra note 81, at 49; Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446, 460 
(1948). 
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permissible weekly working hours would make workers more efficient 
and happier.92 
Of course, because the overtime provision does not provide for an 
absolute cap, employees often work overtime.93  Congress reasoned that 
the increased wage employees receive during overtime workweeks 
accommodates this problem.94  Specifically, the overtime premium fairly 
compensates employees for the additional physical and emotional 
suffering they endure when required to work “intolerable hours” during 
overtime workweeks.95 
The overtime provision’s humanitarian objective and its exemption 
for certain salaried employees96 illuminates the Act’s targeted 
beneficiaries—poor, uneducated, blue collar workers.97  Unlike white 
collar workers—who may freely sit down, take coffee breaks, and leave 
work periodically—blue collar workers often work in unforgiving 
conditions.98  Congress hoped to improve the health and wellbeing of blue 
collar workers by minimizing their exposure to the harsh conditions 
associated with overtime hours.99  In this way, the Act shakes its fists at 
“those who wax rich by paying starvation wages and working women and 
children long hours,”100 and provides a shield for the nation’s working 
class—those who lack the power to remedy the injustices that plague 
them.101 
Finally, in accomplishing these economic and humanitarian aims, the 
Act aims to balance employers’ and employees’ competing interests by 
safeguarding humane employment conditions “without substantially 
curtailing employment or earning power.”102  The permissive nature of the 
overtime penalty accommodates this balance.  Specifically, Congress 
favored a financial disincentive over an outright cap because the relatively 
forgiving economic strain associated with a 50% overtime wage increase 
provided employers with more flexibility than an unforgiving ceiling on 
permitted weekly hours.103  The overtime provision’s title, “maximum 
                                                          
 92.   See LINDER, supra note 81, at 49. 
 93.   See id. at 40–42 (distinguishing a true maximum hours provision from an overtime penalty). 
 94.   See id. at 48–51. 
 95.   See id. at 49; Bay Ridge Operating Co., 334 U.S. at 460. 
 96.   29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2012).  
 97.   See LINDER, supra note 81, at 9, 48. 
 98.   See id. at 9. 
 99.   See id. 
 100.   82 CONG. REC. 1601 (1937) (statement of Rep. Martin). 
 101.   See H.R. REP. NO. 1452, at 56 (1937).  
 102.   29 U.S.C. § 202(b) (2012).   
 103.   See LINDER, supra note 81, at 43–44 (discussing Congresspersons’ distaste for unforgiving 
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hours,” is instructive in this regard—the penalty is intended to effectuate, 
without mandating, a forty-hour maximum workweek.104 
C. The Circuit Split 
Three Courts of Appeals have implicitly or explicitly considered 
overtime gap time.  Though no clear consensus has emerged, the courts’ 
analyses inform this inquiry. 
1. Donovan v. Crisostomo 
In 1982, the Ninth Circuit considered an issue nearly identical to 
overtime gap time, used reasoning that illuminates the current overtime 
gap time inquiry, and set the stage for the cases that would follow.105  The 
case, Donovan v. Crisostomo, involved a construction company that 
impermissibly required its employees to pay it a cash “kickback” during 
overtime weeks.106  The kickback reduced the employees’ regular rate of 
pay to an amount that differed both from the hourly rate of pay listed on 
the employees’ paychecks and from the hourly rate the employer promised 
to pay the employees in the parties’ employment agreements.107  After the 
district court required the employer to reimburse the employees for the 
impermissible kickbacks during overtime weeks, the employer appealed, 
contending that it had not violated the FLSA because the impermissible 
kickbacks neither related to unpaid overtime hours nor caused the 
employees’ regular rates of pay to fall below the minimum wage.108 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed.  Reasoning that a contrary decision 
would “frustrate the policy of Section 7 of the FLSA,” the court explained 
that allowing an employer to deduct amounts from straight time pay during 
overtime workweeks would circumvent the overtime provision’s purpose 
“to spread work and to provide for the strain of long hours by making 
overtime work more expensive.”109  It further declared that permitting 
employers to falsely diminish straight time pay during overtime 
                                                          
rules and preference for penalties more adaptable to real life work conditions in the context of 
comparing an outright ban on night work with a heightened rate of pay for night work). 
 104.   LINDER, supra note 81, at 41, 41 n.181 (noting that the overtime premium was intended to 
be “prohibitively costly” (quoting Fighting the War on a 40-Hour Week, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1942, 
at 24)).  
 105.   See generally Donovan v. Crisostomo, 689 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1982).  
 106.   Id. at 872.  
 107.   Id.  
 108.   Id. at 876. 
 109.   Id. at 872–76.  
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workweeks would provide employers with an opportunity to circumvent 
“a necessary element of the overtime compensation” and “effectively 
eliminate the premium paid for overtime by taking kickbacks out of 
straight time wages in an amount equal to or greater than the overtime 
premium.”110  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district 
court correctly required the employer to reimburse its employees. 
2. Monahan v. County of Chesterfield 
In Monahan v. County of Chesterfield, the Fourth Circuit implicitly 
recognized an overtime gap time claim.111  There, twelve police officers 
sought compensation for unpaid straight time hours during both 
nonovertime and overtime weeks.112  The County paid the officers 
pursuant to an extended twenty-four-day pay period with an 
accompanying 147-hour overtime threshold113 (as is authorized by the § 
207(k) exemption).114  The officers typically worked 135 hours during 
their twenty-four-day work cycle, but occasionally instead worked 144 
hours during the twenty-four-day cycle.115  The County compensated the 
officers via a biweekly salary, and paid additional compensation at a rate 
of one and one-half times the officers’ regular rate of pay if the employees 
worked more than 147 hours during the pay period.116  The officers always 
received overtime compensation when they worked more than 147 hours 
during the pay cycle.117 
The officers conceded that the County paid an appropriate overtime 
rate during cycles in which the officers worked more than 147 hours.118  
They instead alleged that the County only intended their salary to 
compensate them for 135 hours of work during each cycle, and that it 
                                                          
 110.   Id. at 876. 
 111.   See generally Monahan v. County of Chesterfield, 95 F.3d 1263 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 112.   Id. at 1264–65. 
 113.   Id. at 1265. 
 114.   29 U.S.C. § 207(k) (2012).  Section 207 provides a special exception to the typical forty-
hour workweek that permits law enforcement employers to impose an extended work cycle in lieu of 
a seven-day work cycle, with an accompanying extended overtime threshold in lieu of the forty-hour 
threshold.  See 29 U.S.C. § 207; 29 C.F.R. § 553.230 (2017).  The regulation permits work cycles as 
long as twenty-eight days, with an accompanying 171-hour overtime threshold for the twenty-eight 
day period.  Id. at § 553.230(b).  Such employers may opt to implement shorter work periods, so long 
as they compensate employees pursuant to an overtime rate “which bears the same relationship to 171 
as the number of days in the work period bears to 28.”  Id.  Thus, for example, for a twenty-four-day 
work period, the overtime threshold is 147 hours. Id. § 553.230(c). 
 115.   Monahan, 95 F.3d at 1265–66. 
 116.   Id. at 1266.  
 117.   Id. 
 118.   Id. at 1265. 
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shorted them straight time pay when it failed to increase their biweekly 
paychecks to account for the hours the officers worked between 135 and 
147 hours in any work cycle.119  Thus, the employees argued, the employer 
owed them back “overtime gap time” for those uncompensated straight 
time hours during overtime cycles, and “pure gap time”120 for 
uncompensated straight time during nonovertime cycles.121 
The Fourth Circuit ultimately decided in favor of the employer.122  
However, the court did not disclaim the possibility of a valid overtime gap 
time claim.123  Instead, after construing the FLSA’s purpose and intended 
effect,124 deferring to administrative interpretation § 778.315,125 and citing 
Donovan,126 the court predicated its decision on a factual finding that the 
parties actually intended the biweekly salary to compensate the employees 
for all straight time hours, including the allegedly unpaid overtime gap 
time hours.127  As a result, the court reasoned, the employer necessarily 
could not conceivably owe the employees an additional sum for what the 
court deemed properly compensated straight time hours.128 
In so holding, the court implicitly recognized that the FLSA provides 
a remedy for overtime gap time under appropriate circumstances.129  The 
opinion supports this conclusion for two reasons: (1) the court recognized 
that a party could bring an overtime gap cause of action under appropriate 
circumstances; and (2) though it could have dispensed with the police 
officer’s pure and overtime gap time claims in one broad stroke, it 
separately analyzed the issues and dismissed the overtime gap time claim 
because it found insufficient factual, rather than legal, support.130 
The Fourth Circuit recognized an overtime gap time claim because it 
explicitly referred to overtime gap time causes of action and used language 
that assumes the validity of such claims.131  The court recognized such 
                                                          
 119.   Id. at 1266, 1273. 
 120.   Id. at 1266. 
 121.   Id. 
 122.   Id. at 1284.  
 123.   See generally id. 
 124.   Id. at 1266–67. 
 125.   Id. at 1272–73. 
 126.   Id. at 1282.  
 127.   Id. at 1263, 1276, 1278 (“[T]he County’s contention that the agreement was that the salary 
compensated the officers for all hours worked up to the threshold is fully supported by the record.”). 
 128.   Id. at 1273–76. 
 129.   See id. 
 130.   See Barvinchak v. Ind. Reg’l Med. Ctr., No. 3:2006-69, 2007 WL 2903911, at *5–6 (W.D. 
Pa. Sept. 28, 2007) (thoroughly construing Monahan and determining that it recognized a remedy for 
overtime gap time). 
 131.   Monahan, 95 F.3d at 1273. 
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causes of action by setting two conditions precedent to pleading valid 
overtime gap time claims.  First, it stated, “[f]or there to be an overtime 
gap time cause of action under the FLSA, a violation of section 206 or 207 
of the Act must first exist.”132  Next, explaining that courts must consider 
parties’ employment agreements in determining proper overtime 
compensation,133 it articulated a test that sets forth circumstances in which 
§ 778.315 would not support an overtime gap time claim: 
[U]nder 778.315, if (1) all straight time compensation due to the 
employee for nonovertime hours under the express or implied 
employment agreement or applicable statute has been paid and (2) the 
employee has been compensated at a rate of at least time and a half for 
all hours worked in excess of the maximum allowed, the employer has 
acted in compliance with the FLSA.134 
This two-pronged, conjunctive test certainly supports the proposition 
that FLSA provides a remedy for uncompensated overtime gap time.  If 
the court merely intended to delineate proper pay practices for overtime 
hours under the FLSA without implicating straight time hours worked 
during overtime weeks, it need not have required that the employer 
compensate its employees for all hours worked under the employment 
agreement—the second part of the rule alone would have sufficed.  In fact, 
although the word “gap” does not appear in the first portion of this quoted 
language, the language nonetheless implicitly recognizes overtime gap 
time because no claim for overtime gap time can exist if all straight time 
compensation during an overtime workweek has been paid—in such 
circumstances, there is simply no “gap” for the court to fill.  Of course, if 
the court did not recognize overtime gap time, it need not have set forth 
conditions precedent to validly bringing such claims. 
The Fourth Circuit also construed the relevant advisory interpretations 
in a manner that suggests it recognizes overtime gap time in appropriate 
circumstances.135  It noted that the advisory interpretations that require 
employers to compensate employees for all straight time hours worked 
during overtime workweeks “command[] considerable deference” and 
“constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts 
and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”136  It need not have 
                                                          
 132.   Id. at 1284 (emphasis added). 
 133.   Id. at 1273. 
 134.   Id. (emphasis added). 
 135.   See id. 
 136.   Id. at 1272 n.10. 
2018 BRIDGING THE GAP 621 
construed and deferred to these advisory interpretations if it found them 
poorly reasoned or inapplicable. 
Next, though a factual inquiry could have dispensed with the overtime 
and pure gap time claims in one broad stroke, the court instead analyzed 
the pure and overtime gap time claims separately.137  It employed a fact-
based analysis to dismiss the overtime gap time claim and a distinct legal 
analysis to dispense with the pure gap time claim.138  In distinguishing 
between the legal and factual disposition, it purported to “place some 
common sense limitations on claims for straight time brought pursuant to 
the FLSA.”139 
Though the facts of the case did not require it to do so,140 the court 
decisively held that the FLSA could never support a pure gap time claim 
both because a relevant 1987 DOL Letter Ruling recognized overtime gap 
time but not pure gap time, and because the statutory text does not facially 
compel reimbursement for pure gap time.141  As to overtime gap time, the 
court undertook no such analysis and made no such proclamation.142 
Of course, a similar textual analysis could have foreclosed the 
overtime gap time claim: § 206 does not address unpaid straight time even 
if the employee works the unpaid straight time hours during overtime 
weeks.143  In fact, as discussed below, other courts employed this precise 
reasoning and have rejected overtime gap time claims purely because the 
minimum wage and overtime provisions do not explicitly provide for such 
claims.144  The two-part analysis suggests the court did not find overtime 
gap time per se legally impermissible. 
Similarly, the factual inquiry that compelled the court to dismiss the 
overtime gap time claims equally compelled it to dismiss the pure gap time 
claims.  Because the employee’s salaries compensated them for all hours 
up to the overtime threshold, the employees could not conceivably have 
                                                          
 137.   See id. at 1273–84. 
 138.   See id. 
 139.   Id. at 1266. 
 140.   The case could have been decided entirely on the facts.  The court held that the officers 
received proper compensation for all nonovertime hours.  Id. at 1276 (“Plaintiffs contend in Claim 1 
that because the County regularly scheduled them for 135 hours per cycle, instead of the 147 maximum 
allowed, their salary only compensated them for those 135 hours and that they are therefore due the 
gap compensation when overtime hours were worked. This argument seems counter-intuitive and 
rather absurd for several reasons.”).  Naturally then, no pure gap time hours even existed.  
 141.   Id. at 1280, 1283–84 (finding that because § 206 does not facially require reimbursement 
for unpaid straight time, “there can be no violation of the FLSA for failure to pay such pure gap time 
claims,” where the officers worked more than 135 hours but less than 147 hours in the pay cycle). 
 142.   See id. 
 143.   See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012).  
 144.   Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 116 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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proved pure gap time on the facts.  Rather than truncating its inquiry and 
resolving the entire case on the facts, the Fourth Circuit undertook a 
distinct, lengthy legal analysis and instead categorically rejected all pure 
gap time claims.145 
In summary, Monahan’s language and reasoning illustrate that the 
Fourth Circuit recognizes a cause of action for overtime gap time.  Several 
courts have since recognized Monahan’s implicit holding.146  However, 
not all courts accept its reasoning.147 
                                                          
 145.   Monahan, 95 F.3d at 1280–84. 
 146.   See, e.g., Davis v. Abington Mem’l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 244 (3d Cir. 2014) (“However, 
some courts have recognized as viable gap time claims by an employee who exceeds the overtime 
threshold, but whose employment contract does not compensate him or her for all non-overtime hours 
(‘overtime gap time’). . . .  We need not resolve the issue in this case because . .. plaintiffs have not 
plausibly alleged that they worked overtime.” (citations omitted)); Lundy, 711 F.3d at 116 ([S]ome 
courts may allow such claims to a limited extent. Among them is the Fourth Circuit in Monahan 
(citations omitted)); Rosario v. First Student Mgmt. LLC, No. 15-6478, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
108172, at *12–13 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2016) (“Two courts have directly addressed this narrow issue 
of whether the FLSA contemplates overtime gap time claims: the Second Circuit in Lundy v. Catholic 
Health Sys. [sic] of Long Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2013) and the Fourth Circuit in Monahan 
v. Cnty. [sic] of Chesterfield, Va., 95 F.3d 1263 (4th Cir. 1996) The result was a circuit split with the 
Fourth Circuit recognizing the viability of overtime gap time claims in limited circumstances and the 
Second Circuit soundly rejecting overtime gap time claims under the FLSA.”); Perez v. Wells Fargo 
& Co., 75 F. Supp. 3d 1184, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (discussing Monahan and conceding that Donovan 
v. Crisostomo, 689 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1982), arguably provided basis for an overtime gap time claim 
in the Ninth Circuit, but ultimately finding that Donovan did not govern the issue before it because the 
plaintiffs in the present case asserted a pure gap time claim); Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 
No. 09-cv-625-bbc, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154706, at *31 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 11, 2011) (“Although the 
majority of courts reject pure gap-time claims, many courts have recognized gap time claims if (1) an 
employee exceeds the overtime threshold; and (2) the employment contract does not expressly or 
implicitly compensate the employee for all non-overtime hours.” (citing Monahan, 95 F.3d at 1272–
73.)); Valcho v. Dall. Cty. Hosp. Dist., 658 F. Supp. 2d 802, 811 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (finding no Fifth 
Circuit controlling precedent, but stating that “courts generally recognize claims for unpaid straight-
time pay when the employee has worked overtime qualifying hours during that pay period” and citing 
Monahan as an example of the majority approach); Koelker v. Mayor & City Council, 599 F. Supp. 
2d 624, 635 (D. Md. 2009) (finding that Monahan required it “to allow a straight time compensation 
claim ‘for gap hours when overtime hours [are] worked during a pay cycle’”); Barvinchak v. Ind. 
Reg’l Med. Ctr., No. 3:2006-69, 2007 WL 2903911, at *5–6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2007) (“[T]he court 
analyzed the pure gap time and overtime gap time claims separately.” (citing Monahan, 95 F.3d at 
1284)). 
 147.   Rosario, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108172, at *15–18 (noting that the Third Circuit had not 
resolved the issue, but finding Lundy persuasive); Espenscheid, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154706, at 
*29, *31–38 (finding that though the Seventh Circuit has not yet considered the gap time issue, the 
FLSA’s text does not specifically provide for overtime gap time, and the overtime context does not 
justify treating overtime and pure gap time differently); Hensley v. First Student Mgmt., No. 15-3811, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43000, at *9–12 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2016) (recognizing that “[o]nly two Circuits 
have directly addressed this issue,” and finding insufficient statutory basis in the FLSA’s plain text for 
overtime gap time).  
2018 BRIDGING THE GAP 623 
3. Lundy v. Catholic Health System of Long Island Inc. 
In Lundy v. Catholic Health System of Long Island Inc., the Second 
Circuit rejected Monahan and forbade both pure and overtime gap time 
claims under the FLSA.148  There, three healthcare professionals filed a 
class action lawsuit against their employer Catholic Health System of 
Long Island Inc. (“CHS”), a healthcare group.149  The employees alleged 
that CHS violated the FLSA when it used an automatic time-keeping 
system that failed to compensate them for work time spent at training 
sessions, during pre-shift preparation and post-shift closing duties, and for 
work the employees completed during the employees’ scheduled lunch 
breaks.150  They sought remuneration for both pure and overtime gap 
time.151 
The court rejected the employees’ overtime and pure gap time claims 
with relatively little comment.152  It dismissed the pure gap time claim in 
a single sentence, merely noting, “[a]n employee who has not worked 
overtime has no claim under FLSA for hours worked below the 40-hour 
overtime threshold, unless the average hourly wage falls below the federal 
minimum wage.”153 
As to the overtime gap time claim, the Second Circuit primarily relied 
on the FLSA’s text.154  Conceding that some courts recognize overtime 
gap time, the Second Circuit nonetheless deemed the textual support for 
overtime gap time insufficient.155  It reasoned that because the FLSA only 
governs minimum wages and overtime hours, its text in no way addresses 
overtime gap time.156  According to the Second Circuit, the minimum wage 
provision only provides a remedy if the employee receives an average 
hourly wage below the statutory minimum, and the overtime provision 
provides a remedy only if the employer does not properly compensate the 
employee for overtime hours.157  Thus, the court explained, the FLSA 
provides no recourse for uncompensated straight time hours unless the 
                                                          
 148.   Lundy, 711 F.3d at 115–16. 
 149.   Id. at 110. 
 150.   Id. at 110–11. 
 151.   See id. at 115–16. 
 152.   See id. at 109, 115–17. 
 153.   Id. at 115. 
 154.   See id. at 116–17. 
 155.   Id. at 116. 
 156.   Id. 
 157.   Id. 
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employer’s pay practices independently violate the minimum wage 
provision.158 
The court further declined to rely on the interpretive guidance set forth 
under § 778.315 and § 778.317.159  Such guidance, it explained, merits 
deference only to the extent the court finds its thoroughness, reasoning, 
consistency with other pronouncements, and other characteristics 
persuasive.160  Calling the guidance “unreasoned,” the court summarily 
concluded that because the interpretations lack sufficient independent 
statutory support, they are not persuasive.161  Finally, the Second Circuit 
noted that state labor and contract laws provide adequate legal 
protection.162  It turned to the plaintiff’s other claims without additional 
comment.163 
III. ANALYSIS 
The appropriate treatment of overtime gap time vexes even the 
brightest legal minds.164  Courts disagree about whether the overtime 
provision inherently supports a remedy for overtime gap time,165 the 
appropriate weight to afford the FLSA’s intended purpose,166 and whether 
the Administrator’s advisory interpretation merits deference.167 
This Comment advocates for a pro-overtime gap time, “Monahan 
approach,” and rejects the contrary “Lundy approach.”  It urges that the 
Monahan approach best resolves the overtime gap time problem because 
(a) the overtime provision implicitly requires a remedy for overtime gap 
time, (b) failure to recognize a remedy for overtime gap time would 
directly contravene the purpose of the overtime provision, and (c) the 
Administrator’s guidance merits deference. 
A. The Overtime Provision Fills the Gap 
Though the FLSA does not explicitly address overtime gap time, its 
                                                          
 158.   Id. 
 159.   Id. at 116–17. 
 160.   Id. at 116. 
 161.   Id. at 116–17. 
 162.   Id. at 116. 
 163.   Id. at 117. 
 164.   See, e.g., Lundy, 711 F.3d at 116; Monahan v. County of Chesterfield, 95 F.3d 1263 (4th 
Cir. 1996); Donovan v. Crisostomo, 689 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 165.   Compare Monahan, 95 F.3d at 1267–80, with Lundy, 711 F.3d at 117. 
 166.   See generally Donovan, 689 F.2d 869. 
 167.   Compare Monahan, 95 F.3d at 1267–80, with Lundy, 711 F.3d at 116–17. 
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language and structure inherently require employers to compensate 
employees for every hour worked during overtime workweeks.168  This 
requirement derives from (1) the textually mandated “regular rate of pay” 
and its relationship to the overtime provision, and (2) the assumption, 
implicit in the overtime provision’s use of the regular rate, that the 
employer has paid the employee for the hours he or she actually worked.169  
The Monahan approach provides a reasoned solution to an ambiguous 
statutory question, while the Lundy approach confuses the term “regular 
rate of pay” and renders the statutory overtime premium ineffective. 
First, the Monahan approach best reconciles (1) the definition of 
regular rate (“the hourly rate actually paid for the normal, non-overtime 
workweek”170), with (2) the formula for computing the regular rate (total 
remuneration / the total number of [nonovertime]171 hours actually worked 
in given workweek172), and (3) the formula for computing overtime 
compensation (one and one-half times the regular rate of pay173).  In 
ambiguity, legal scholars often construe statutory text so as to make the 
text’s terms operate consistently.174 
Of course, because salaried employees may work different hours from 
week to week, their regular rates may fluctuate.  However, the regular rate 
should not fluctuate when an employee is paid a specified sum for every 
hour of work, but should instead logically equal the employee’s agreed 
upon wage multiplied by the number of hours worked.  Critically, overtime 
gap time will never arise when an employee receives a weekly salary that 
compensates the employees for all hours worked up to the overtime 
threshold because in such circumstances, no straight time hours exist to 
slip between the statutory gap between the minimum wage and overtime 
provisions.  Thus, any time overtime gap time arises, the term “regular 
rate” should operate consistently. 
                                                          
 168.   See Monahan, 95 F.3d at 1267–80; Donovan, 689 F.2d at 872–76. 
 169.   See Barvinchak v. Ind. Reg’l Med. Ctr., No. 3:2006-69, 2007 WL 2903911, at *5–6 (W.D. 
Pa. Sept. 28, 2007). 
 170.   149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331 U.S. 199, 204 (1947) (quoting Walling v. 
Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37, 40 (1944)), modified, 331 U.S. 795 (1947). 
 171.   See 29 C.F.R. § 778.322 (2017) (explaining the consequences of reducing the fixed 
workweek for which a salary is paid below forty hours). 
 172.   29 C.F.R. § 778.109 (2017); Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446, 461 (1948) 
(“Once the parties have decided upon the amount of wages and the mode of payment the determination 
of the regular rate becomes a matter of mathematical computation, the result of which is unaffected 
by any designation of a contrary ‘regular rate’ in the wage contracts.” (quoting Walling v. 
Youngerman-Reynolds Hardware Co., 325 U.S. 419, 424–25 (1945))). 
 173.   29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2012).  
 174.   Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia’s Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 535 (1997) 
(book review). 
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Consider the hypothetical in the Introduction of this Comment.  As 
defined, Ernst’s regular rate of pay is $12 per hour, and his employer owes 
him $570 for 45 hours of work (($12 x 40 = $480) + ((1.5 x $12 = $18 
overtime premium rate) x 5 = $90) = $570).  However, because his 
employer only paid him $420 total ($12 per hour x 35 hours paid), as 
computed, his regular rate is $9.33 ($420 / 45 hours actually worked = 
$9.33).  Similarly, in the hypothetical Weeks 1–4 described in Part II.a. of 
this Comment, Ernst’s mathematical regular rate fluctuates from week to 
week: it is $11.40 in Week 1, impermissibly dips below the minimum 
wage to $6.00 in Week 2, rises to $11.43 again in Week 3, and falls again 
to $10.86 in Week 4.  Because the slaughterhouse failed to properly 
compensate Ernst for all hours worked, his regular rate becomes 
“‘irregular’ in a mathematical sense.”175 
Under these circumstances, it is also unclear whether the 
slaughterhouse should reimburse Ernst in an amount necessary to elevate 
his overtime rate to an amount equal to one and one-half times the rate the 
parties agreed Ernst would receive for each nonovertime hour, or an 
amount equal to the mathematical regular rate of pay.  For example, in the 
opening hypothetical a court could reasonably conclude that Ernst’s 
regular rate is $9.33, and compute an accompanying overtime rate of $14 
rather than $18.  Under this hypothetical, Ernst would receive a diminished 
overtime rate of pay.  Thus, the Lundy standard diminishes the de facto 
regular rate to amounts below the intended regular rate, and ultimately the 
formula for computing the regular rate conflicts with its definition and 
relationship to the overtime premium. 
In contrast, if the slaughterhouse paid Ernst overtime gap time, his 
regular rate would be just as intended—regular.  The slaughterhouse 
would be compelled to reimburse Ernst for the unpaid straight time hours: 
every overtime week his regular rate would equal $12, and his overtime 
rate would equal $18.  The Monahan approach appropriately relieves 
courts from the burden of discerning the appropriate method of 
determining the regular rate for overtime purposes because it ensures the 
definition of regular rate and the formula for computing it align. 
The Lundy approach also creates ambiguity concerning the amount of 
overtime compensation an employer owes his employees for unpaid 
overtime hours during workweeks with gap time and leaves courts with a 
choice between two competing methods of computing back overtime 
compensation in workweeks with gap hours, each of which proves 
problematic.  Specifically, the Lundy approach causes confusion as to 
whether: (1) the employer is entitled to assume the employee was paid his 
                                                          
 175.   Walling v. A. H. Belo Corp., 316 U.S. 624, 632 (1942). 
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regular rate for the unpaid overtime hours such that he is only owed the 
difference between the regular rate and the overtime premium rate of pay 
(one and one-half times the regular rate), or (2) the employer must instead 
assume the employee worked but was not paid at all for the shorted hours 
(and was not even paid his regular rate for those hours), and must therefore 
pay the entire overtime premium. 
Under the first, “mathematical method,” an employer assumes the 
employee has accepted a reduced wage for all hours, distributes the 
amount it actually paid the employee evenly across all hours the employee 
actually worked (including the unpaid overtime hours), and accordingly 
may reduce the overtime premium he owes for each hour by the regular 
rate.  Ultimately the employer will only owe an additional amount equal 
to one-half times the employees’ regular rate of pay for all overtime hours.  
This is the approach the Second Circuit employed in Lundy.  There, the 
court assumed that the employees impliedly agreed to accept a diminished 
regular rate of pay rate.176  So long as the employee receives one and one-
half times this diminished rate, the reduction in overtime pay is a logical 
result of the relationship between the regular rate of pay and the overtime 
provision. 
The mathematical method avoids characterizing the unpaid straight 
time hours as ostensibly “paid” at a diminished rate for the purposes of 
computing reimbursement for those straight time hours while 
simultaneously characterizing unpaid overtime hours as “unpaid” for the 
purposes of computing overtime reimbursement.  However, this 
interpretation conflicts with the method courts must use to compute the 
overtime premium for salaried employees under governing Supreme Court 
precedent.177 
In Missel, the Supreme Court expressly forbade employers from 
falsely attributing sums regularly paid to an employee via a weekly salary 
to the amount due for overtime hours at the heightened overtime 
premium.178  Under Missel, employers may not effectively avoid paying 
                                                          
 176.   Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 116 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing 
United States v. Klinghoffer Bros. Realty Corp., 285 F.2d 487, 494 (2d Cir. 1960)). 
 177.   See generally Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1942), superseded by 
statute on other grounds, Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-49, §10, 61 Stat. 84, 89 (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 260 (2012) (finding that employers may not satisfy overtime pay obligations 
by attributing amounts paid for nonovertime work to overtime hours). 
 178.   Id. at 581–83.  In Missel, a transportation company paid its employees via a weekly salary, 
and argued the salary compensated them for all overtime and nonovertime hours, so that the “regular 
rate” fluctuated from week to week, and it only owed additional overtime compensation if the 
mathematical average reduced the overtime premium to a sum below one and one-half times the 
minimum wage.  Id. 
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all overtime compensation by characterizing unpaid overtime hours as 
ostensibly paid by a weekly salary, and under ordinary circumstances,179 
may not compute the overtime premium based on one and one-half times 
a fluctuating, implicitly reduced regular rate of pay.180  Permitting 
employers to characterize the overtime hours as ostensibly paid effectively 
requires courts to characterize unpaid overtime hours as supplemented by 
nonovertime compensation, which contravenes the Supreme Court’s 
purpose and reasoning in Missel. 
The second, “factual method” for computing overtime compensation 
allows courts to avoid falsely attributing amounts paid for nonovertime 
compensation to overtime work.  Under the factual method, an employer 
owes the full overtime premium for all unpaid overtime hours but owes 
nothing for the unpaid straight time hours.  The factual method is viable if 
one accepts that the employer failed to pay any overtime compensation as 
a factual matter.  Of course, calling either method “factual” is necessarily 
a misnomer—characterizing any hours, even straight time hours, in which 
the employee in fact received zero dollars per hour requires courts to 
ignore the fact of nonpayment, a characteristic inherent to any gap time 
claim. 
However, the factual method poses a distinct problem: to determine 
that the gap hours did not cause a minimum wage violation, and to 
compute the regular rate of pay, courts must necessarily attribute the 
mathematical rate to each hour, including overtime hours.  Accepting that 
the employer paid nothing for the overtime hours and requiring full 
overtime compensation illogically requires courts to compute the overtime 
premium in a way that simultaneously characterizes the same straight time 
hours as paid and unpaid, and simultaneously characterize certain shorted 
hours as paid, but other shorted hours as unpaid.  Thus, the Monahan 
approach properly avoids confusing the overtime provision’s use of the 
regular rate, and provides for straightforward interpretation and 
calculation of that amount. 
Finally, the FLSA’s text arguably compels an employer to compensate 
his employees for each hour worked in overtime workweeks because one 
might reasonably read the overtime provision to inherently assume proper 
payment for nonovertime hours.  Specifically, the textual requirement that 
employees receive an amount one and one-half times their regular rates of 
pay for hours that exceed the overtime threshold presumes that the 
                                                          
 179.   The FLSA provides for a fluctuating workweek in certain rare circumstances.  See 29 C.F.R. 
§ 778.114(a) (2017).  This comment assumes the employer and employee have not agreed to a 
fluctuating workweek.  
 180.   Id. 
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employees have received compensation for each individual hour in the 
week, including the hours the employee must have worked to elevate his 
workweek above the overtime threshold.  An employer cannot have 
effectively paid an employee one and one-half times his regular rate of pay 
unless the employee has received his regular rate of pay for the relevant 
week.  Thus, under this second reading, the overtime provision’s text 
requires a remedy for unpaid overtime gap time.181 
B. The Monahan Approach Accommodates the Act’s Purpose 
The FLSA inherently provides a remedy for overtime gap time 
because only the Monahan approach adequately accounts for the Act’s 
purpose.  In contrast, the Lundy approach is repugnant to the Act’s purpose 
because it negates the financial loss that the overtime penalty attempts to 
inflict on employers, thereby insufficiently encouraging employers to hire 
new employees, and it fails to fairly compensate employees for the 
additional hardship associated with long hours and insufficient pay.182 
The Lundy approach contravenes the overtime provision’s purpose 
because it rewards employers both for imposing unforgiving hours and for 
failing to properly compensate their employees.  When employers escape 
paying employees overtime gap time, the uncompensated hours 
undeniably reduce the overall compensation employers must pay 
employees during overtime weeks.183  Such an approach impermissibly 
empowers employers to effectively extract wages from employees’ 
straight time hours and reallocate them to overtime compensation.  This 
result compels employees to supplement the employer’s overtime 
obligation with their own earnings, and effectively pay for the additional 
work hours. 
Under the Lundy approach, the Act provides an effective loophole and 
gives employers an opportunity to circumvent the increased rate.184  
Greedy employers might implement policies designed to exploit this 
failure, and as a result hire fewer employees and work each employee 
                                                          
 181.   The extent to which the term “regular rate of pay” also compels payment of overtime gap 
time is considered below.  The regular rate is merely a tool that parties must use to determine the 
overtime rate of pay—it does not actually govern payment of nonovertime hours.  However, as is 
explained below, the way that the regular rate operates becomes unclear in the context of overtime gap 
time, which makes the overtime rate of pay equally unclear.  This poses a problem of consistency and 
is therefore considered in the consistency section.  This subsection does not further discuss the term 
because the confusion arises with reference to its operation, not the statutory language. 
 182.   See supra Part II.b. 
 183.   29 C.F.R. § 778.109 (2017). 
 184.   See Donovan v. Crisostomo, 689 F.2d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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additional hours.  Though the Act treats straight time and overtime hours 
distinctly, employees’ paychecks make no such distinction between the 
hours—whether the loss derives from overtime gap time or an unpaid 
overtime premium, the result is the same: decreased income.185  The mere 
fact that the FLSA compels employers to pay an overtime premium 
arguably makes this result untenable. 
An example illustrates this absurdity.  Recall Ernst.  In the opening 
hypothetical, the slaughterhouse paid him $420, rather than $570 for forty-
five hours of work.  Under the minimum wage calculation, we determined 
Ernst’s mathematical rate of pay was $9.33 per hour and that the 
slaughterhouse therefore did not violate § 206.  This sum is also his regular 
rate of pay under the formula for computing the regular rate ($420 / 45 
hours worked).  Though Ernst’s pay check does not delineate which sums 
were paid for which hours, and though the hourly allocation makes little 
difference to Ernst (who only sees the final sum), under the principles 
advanced by Lundy, courts might falsely assume he implicitly agreed to 
receive payment for all hours at a reduced rate and employ the 
mathematical method described above to reduce the amount of 
compensation owed to Ernst for the entirely unpaid overtime hours. 
In fact, the slaughterhouse owes Ernst $90 additional dollars for hours 
forty through forty-five (($12 per hour x 1.5 = $18 per hour) x 5 = $90).  
However, courts that use the mathematical method would force the 
assumption (that Ernst received payment for all hours) used to compute 
back minimum wage compensation into the overtime context would 
instead submit that the slaughterhouse owes him $43.35 for those hours 
($90 owed minus the amount he was initially paid for those hours under 
the wage rate calculation ($9.33 per hour paid x 5 = $46.65); ($90 – 46.65 
= $43.35)).  This effectively diminishes both Ernst’s overtime and overall 
compensation.  In such case, even after the Department of Labor compels 
the employer to pay the back overtime hours, Ernst receives $463.35 total 
($43.35 owed + $420 initially paid = $463.35 total compensation), an 
amount that significantly undercuts the value of his overtime work and 
ensures Ernst ultimately receives an amount less than the $480 the 
slaughterhouse would owe him even in a 40 hour nonovertime workweek. 
The factual approach does not resolve this problem.  Under that 
approach, courts assume the employer effectively paid the straight time 
hours at a diminished rate, but paid no compensation for the shorted 
                                                          
 185.   See 29 C.F.R. § 778.317 (2017); cf. Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, No. 09-cv-625-
bbc, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154706, at *34–35 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 11, 2011) (“However, this is not quite 
accurate because an employer’s failure to pay for nonovertime hours does not diminish an employee’s 
overtime compensation.  Rather, it diminishes the employee’s overall compensation, but there is no 
language in the FLSA creating a cause of action for diminished overall compensation.”). 
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overtime hours.  Ernst receives the full $90 additional dollars for the 
overtime hours but receives nothing for the straight time hours, so that he 
ultimately receives $510 ($90 owed + $420 initially paid = $510 total).  
Again, this sum undercuts the value of his overtime work—the employer 
ultimately pays Ernst an amount less than what it would have paid him if 
he had worked only two overtime hours (($18 overtime rate x 2 = $36) + 
480 due for the nonovertime hours = $516).  Though this characterization 
does not facially violate the minimum wage provision because Ernst’s 
mathematical average still exceeds the statutory minimum, the 
characterization effectively diverts wages from Ernst’s nonovertime hours 
to falsely characterize his overtime hours as paid.  Thus, under either the 
mathematical or factual approach, Ernst effectively supplements his 
employer’s obligation. 
The Lundy approach not only lends itself to exploitation, but also 
makes the Act’s intended beneficiaries vulnerable to the precise 
exploitation the Act sought to ameliorate.  The Act aimed to benefit very 
poor, working class Americans.186  Today, the WHD often defends non-
English speaking, poor, uneducated workers who lack bargaining power.  
Greedy employers take advantage of these vulnerabilities in ways that 
directly implicate overtime gap time: employers may purposely short 
employees’ paychecks, fail to compensate them for pre-shift and post-shift 
work, fail to pay an overtime premium but demand long schedules.  The 
FLSA should empower those seeking to enforce the law to require 
employers to reimburse employees for overtime gap.  Allowing 
uncompensated work time to fall through the gap significantly erodes the 
purposes of the FLSA and places the burden of overtime compensation on 
the Act’s targeted beneficiaries by requiring them to substitute their 
straight time hours for overtime compensation. 
Of course, one might reasonably conclude that because the Act is 
silent concerning overtime gap time, courts should interpret it to provide 
no remedy for unpaid straight time hours during overtime weeks and 
instead allow the legislature to alter the Act’s text if it chooses.187  
Admittedly, courts and the Department of Labor plainly accept that the 
minimum wage provision does not provide a remedy for unpaid straight 
time during nonovertime weeks.188  Pursuant to this accepted treatment of 
straight time hours during nonovertime weeks, the result described above 
                                                          
 186.   LINDER, supra n. 81, at 9, 48. 
 187.   See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS xii (2012). 
 188.   See Monahan v. County of Chesterfield, 95 F.3d 1263, 1272–73 (4th Cir. 1996); 29 C.F.R. 
§ 778.322 (2017). 
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is arguably not absurd at all, but merely a logical extension of the treatment 
of minimum wage hours during nonovertime weeks. 
However, nothing in the Act facially compels courts to interpret the 
minimum wage provision to provide no remedy for pure gap time.  One 
might rationally read the minimum wage provision to require payment for 
each individual hour worked.  The minimum wage provision requires that 
employees receive “wages” at a “rate” of “7.25 an hour.”189  It does not 
explain the “rate” “an hour” language, but these terms could certainly 
require employers to pay employees at least $7.25 for each individual hour 
worked.  Of course, failure to compensate hourly employees for even a 
single hour logically then violates the minimum wage provision because 
earning zero dollars in any single hour inherently involves working for 
less than the minimum wage in that hour.  In fact, at least one circuit court 
has interpreted the minimum wage provision to require payment for all 
hours worked.190  Because common practice does not necessarily negate 
this natural reading, the Department of Labor’s decision not to require 
courts to reimburse employees for pure gap time does not necessarily 
support an argument that the Act does not implicitly require employees to 
reimburse employees for unpaid hours. 
Furthermore, the overtime context compels this disparate result both 
because the overtime provision facially ties its premium to a specified rate 
and because the overtime workweeks inherently differ from nonovertime 
weeks.  Critically, the regular rate functions as the characteristic that 
divorces the overtime calculation from the more forgiving minimum wage 
“floor.”191  Unlike the overtime provision, the minimum wage provision 
does not compel adherence to an agreed rate of pay, but merely requires 
that employers pay employees at least a minimum amount.  In contrast, 
the overtime provision’s use of the regular rate of pay explicitly links 
employees’ compensation to the rate at which they should have been paid, 
which requires their paychecks to be proportionately increased with each 
hour worked. 
The overtime provision’s purpose also justifies treating 
uncompensated straight time hours differently in overtime and 
nonovertime weeks.  Though employees may not readily distinguish 
between overtime and nonovertime hours on their paychecks, they do 
readily distinguish between overtime and nonovertime weeks.  The Act’s 
structure and legislative history clearly illustrate that Congress appreciated 
                                                          
 189.   29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012).  
 190.   Lamon v. City of Shawnee, 972 F.2d 1145, 1155–58 (10th Cir. 1992). 
 191.   See Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37, 40–42 (1944). 
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this intrinsic distinction;192 it treated the overtime penalty as a functional 
cap on the maximum workweek hours because it recognized that overtime 
workweeks are inherently more arduous.193 
This difference compels courts to look more closely at the hours 
actually worked and actually paid in overtime weeks.  Employees should 
receive an amount that truly reflects the additional strain they suffer in an 
overtime week.  Under the Monahan approach, the unavailability of 
uncompensated pure gap time accords with the less significant remedy 
available under the minimum wage provision.  Furthermore, providing full 
remuneration for overtime gap time adequately reflects the significant 
award associated with the overtime premium. Thus, the treatment pure and 
overtime gap time receive under the Monahan approach ultimately aligns 
with the workweeks to which they relate. 
Proponents of the Lundy approach might reasonably determine that 
the courts need not construe the overtime provision to provide a remedy 
for overtime gap time because contract-based remedies and state-law 
overtime gap time claims provide employees with sufficient protection.  
Admittedly, several states compel employers to reimburse employees for 
unpaid straight time.194  However, not all states provide such a remedy,195 
and logically, most employees (and especially low income employees who 
lack the financial stability to risk their livelihoods) would hesitate to sue 
their employers.  Thus, both state and contractual remedies do not provide 
sufficient protection. 
In sum, the Monahan approach best comports with the overtime 
provision’s purpose because it penalizes employers who fail to hire new 
employees by requiring an overtime premium rate of pay, requires fair 
compensation for the additional suffering employees endure during 
overtime weeks, and logically distinguishes between pure and overtime 
gap time.  Courts should not disregard facts and interpret the law in a way 
that contravenes its intent merely to better accommodate an employer’s 
wrongdoing. 
                                                          
 192.   See 81 CONG. REC. 7746 (1937) (letter of Sen. Hugo L. Black).  
 193.   See LINDER, supra note 81, at 40–42 (distinguishing a true maximum-hour provision from 
an overtime penalty). 
 194.   See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 45-606 (2006 & Supp. 2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.020 
(West 2011); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 663 (McKinney 2002 & 2014 Supp.); 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 333.104 (West 2009 & 2014 Supp.); Lugo v. Farmers Pride, Inc., 967 A.2d 963, 970 (Pa. 
2009). 
 195.   See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1203 (2000 & Supp. 2016). 
634 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 66 
C. The Administrator’s Interpretation Merits Deference 
Finally, courts should recognize overtime gap time because several 
relevant, persuasive, and well-reasoned advisory interpretations explain 
that overtime compensation cannot have been properly paid unless all 
straight time compensation has been paid.196 
Advisory interpretations do not carry the force of law, but instead 
merely indicate the construction that “the Administrator believes to be 
correct and which will guide him in the performance of his administrative 
duties under the Act.”197  Advisory interpretations therefore do not bind 
courts.198  However, the Administrator of Labor promulgates opinions to 
faithfully execute his office, and does so “based upon more specialized 
experience and broader investigations and information than is likely to 
come to a judge in a particular case.”199  Thus, the interpretations provide 
significant guidance,200 and when ambiguity arises, judges routinely defer 
to the Administrator’s expertise and accord the interpretations significant 
weight.201 
In Skidmore v. Swift & Co., the Supreme Court cautioned that courts 
must determine administrative interpretations’ persuasive force on a case-
by-case basis, and in each case consider “the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and 
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control.”202  The advisory regulations that 
require payment of overtime gap time are thoroughly considered, validly 
reasoned, and consistent with other pronouncements.203 
First, the advisory opinions are thoroughly considered and based in 
sound reason.  The Administrator does not simply summarily conclude 
that all straight time hours must be paid in overtime weeks, but explains 
that it rejects such an outcome because the incomplete pay structures have 
                                                          
 196.   29 C.F.R. § 778.315 (2017). 
 197.   29 C.F.R. § 776.0a(a)(1) (2017). 
 198.   Id. (explaining that the provisions only will guide the Administrator in his enforcement 
“unless and until he is otherwise directed by authoritative decisions of the courts”). 
 199.   Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944). 
 200.   Id. at 140. 
 201.   See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (“When faced with a problem of statutory 
construction, this Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or 
agency charged with its administration.”); Conzo v. City of New York, 667 F. Supp. 2d 279, 291 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding it “appropriate to adhere to the [Department of Labor]’s interpretations”).  
 202.   Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
 203.   See id.  
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the “effect of diminishing the employee’s total overtime compensation.”204  
The Administrator reasons that payments “ostensibly paid for overtime” 
cannot truly have been paid for overtime where certain of the employees’ 
working hours remain unpaid in the same pay cycle.205 
This reasoning is persuasive.  Naturally, employers cannot freely 
allocate portions of a paycheck to specific working hours, skipping from 
one hour to the next as it suits the employer’s financial interests.  Though 
employers may allocate payments on paper, physical paychecks are not so 
readily separable.  The Administrator correctly refused to divorce financial 
and administrative concepts from reality to better accommodate 
employers’ failure to pay.206  Furthermore, employers necessarily incur 
overtime premiums for the last hours employees work during the week.  
Thus, permitting a pay structure that compensates employees for overtime 
but not gap time requires a true chronological gap between payments.  The 
advisory opinions rationally caution against such an absurd result. 
Finally, the relevant advisory opinions are certainly consistent with 
the other pronouncements, as is required under the Swift test.  Sections 
778.317 and 778.322, which explain and illustrate section 778.315, were 
issued more than thirty years ago.207  The WHD has not since wavered in 
its position.208  Furthermore, as explained above, the position is consistent 
with the overtime provision, construction of the term regular rate, and the 
purposes that Congress intended the overtime provision to serve.209 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND MOVING FORWARD 
The FLSA was enacted eighty years ago not to prescribe rigid rules, 
but to ensure downtrodden American workers received fair compensation 
for hard work, and to protect them from the dangers inherent to the new 
industrial workforce.  Today, the Act’s silence as to the appropriate 
treatment of overtime gap time threatens to undermine its meaning, 
operation, and purpose. 
Ultimately, several sources provide a logical bridge between the 
minimum wage and overtime provisions and compel courts to recognize a 
                                                          
 204.   29 C.F.R. § 778.317 (2017). 
 205.   Id. 
 206.   See id. 
 207.   See 46 C.F.R. §§ 778.317, 778.322 (1981). 
 208.   See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Opinion Letter, FLSA2008-7NA (May 15, 2008), 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSANA/2008/2008_05_15_07NA_FLSA.pdf; U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor, Opinion Letter, FLSA2004-8NA (Aug. 12, 2004), 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSANA/2004/2004_08_12_08 
FLSA_NA_deminimus.pdf. 
 209.   See supra Parts III.a–b. 
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remedy for overtime gap time.  The overtime provision’s use of the 
“regular rate” and its operation logically require that employees receive all 
compensation due during overtime weeks.  The intended premium 
overtime rate similarly compels this result.  Failing to provide such a 
remedy for overtime gap time contravenes the Act’s clear purpose.  
Finally, several Administrative Interpretations expressly compel payment 
of overtime gap time, and those interpretations are well reasoned and 
textually supported.  In sum, the FLSA implicitly requires courts to 
recognize a remedy for unpaid overtime gap time.  If courts attempt to leap 
the statutory gap between the Act’s overtime and minimum wage 
provisions without considering these critical sources, they may very well 
find themselves in moral freefall. 
 
